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THE STATUTORY INJUNCTION AS AN ENFORCEMENT
WEAPON OF FEDERAL AGENCIES*
Federal statutes regulating business have created a widespread category
of "white-collar crimes," such as failure to pay minimum wages or violation
of brokerage requirements, which seldom incur the taint of moral depravity
normally attached to criminal activity.' A jury may hesitate to find that
even intentional failure to comply with statutory wage standards makes a
criminal of a businessman whom they know as a pillar of the community and
Chairman of the local Red Cross.2 Since criminal prosecution may often be
* The specialized field of anti-trust lies beyond the scope of this Comment, as do ad-
ministrative "cease and desist" orders, and problems encountered in the state courts. Al-
ternative sanctions will be compared with the injunction, but no independent evaluation
of these weapons will be attempted.
1. See Sutherland, Is "White Collar Crime" Crime?, 10 Aa. SocIoL- RLv. 132
(1945).
2. The Office of Price Administration found that "one of the most difficult prob-
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unsuccessful or inappropriate against such offenses, alternative sanctions
are necessary to enforce regulatory statutes fairly and effectively.3
As a preventive weapon, the traditional injunction might be well fitted,
if available, to cope with violations lacking the nefarious quality that ad-
ministrative officials euphemistically refer to as the "sex appeal" necessary
to secure criminal conviction.' Historically, however, "equity will not enjoin
commission of a crime," since an alleged criminal could then be tried for
contempt without a jury. 4 Although this prohibition has been so whittled
away that the government can obtain such an injunction to protect "the
general welfare," 5 the remedy's applicability within this category has still
been limited by the host of aphorisms which embody the prerequisites of
equitable relief. But legislative provision for an injunction liberates the rem-
edy from many of the bonds of equity by satisfying of itself conditions which
the Chancellor would otherwise require to be established in each case.' The
result is a "statutory injunction" which provides the same temporary or
permanent relief as its unrevamped counterpart yet is granted more freely by
the courts.
With increasing frequency during the past fifteen years, Congress has
authorized administrative agencies to seek this sanction against violators of
the statutes that these agencies enforce. Provisions therefor have been in-
cluded in acts such as those establishing the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, the Wage and Hour Division, and the Office of Price Administra-
tion.7 Amendments to their original statutes also furnished the weapon to
lems in this field is to combat the attitude, so prevalent in this country, that the criminal
laws are made for the criminal classes and do not apply to respectable people." OPA
MANUAL § 9-1702.04B (3) (1946) (this date does not refer to the year in which the Man-
ual was published, but rather to the most recent version of the material cited).
3. This difficulty might be corrected by a system of small fines, which was suggested
in 5 OPA Q. REi'. 54 (1943). But federal tribunals have not yet been equippeUl or
authorized to play the role of police courts, and, in fairness to businesses who comply
with a statute, some action.must be taken against minor as well as flagrant violators.
4. See, e.g., Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 402, 413 (1818). And see note 122 infra.
5. E.g., In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895) (labor strike). Equity will act to prevent
irreparable injury to rights of property, even though the threatened offense is also a
crime. This theory has long been construed as permitting the government to obtain in-
junctive relief against a "public nuisance"-an elastic concept which has recently been
expanded to cover almost any situation adversely affecting "the general welfare". See
Caldwell, Injunctions Against Crime, 26 ILL. L. REv. 259, 261-9 (1931) ; Mote, 5 A.L.R.
1474 (1920). For criticism of this expansion, see articles cited in note 121 infra.
6. See pp. 1026-7 infra. To be constitutional as an extension of equity, it seems prob-
able that statutory provision for an injunction must still rest on grounds that violation
of the act affects the "general welfare". See Caldwell, supra note 5 at 278; cf. 4 Pom-
miOt, EQUrry JURiSPRUDENCE § 1349 (5th ed. 1941). But conclusive deference may be
accorded any reasonable legislative determination to that effect. E.g., Mugler v. Kansas,
123 U.S. 623, 660-1 (1887) (liquor a public nuisance).
7. Securities Act of 1933, 48 STAT. 86 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1940) ; Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 48 STAr. 899 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §78u(e) (1940); Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, 52 STAT. 1069 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1940); Emergency Price
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the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Security Administrator, and the
National Labor Relations Board.8 At first glance the threat of a mere judi-
cial order of compliance, without penalties for past violations, might not
seem likely to return many potential violators to the paths of righteousness.
But the statutory injunction has proved extremely useful to administrative
agencies; it provides a sanction which is commensurate with all but flagrant
violations and may be applied without depriving the defendant of his essen-
tial protections. Necessary to an understanding of this weapon's increasing
importance and of the problems raised by its modification of equity principles
is evaluation of the crucial characteristics of availability and effectiveness
which shape its role in the enforcement arsenal.
AVAILABILITY
Major advantages of the statutory injunction as an enforcement weapon
are the ease and speed with which it may be obtained. Judicial criteria for
its issuance, which have been strikingly parallel for all agencies despite ex-
tensive differences in the various grants of authority,O are sufficiently flexible
to render the injunction more readily available than most other sanctions
at the agency's disposal.
Control Act of 1942, 56 STAT. 33 (1942), as amended, 50 U.S.C. Arp. § 925(a) (Supp.
1946) (all hereinafter referred to by U.S.C. number only). Sec Bowles v. Hudspeth, 62
F. Supp. 803 (D. Ore. 1945): "One of the modem miracles is the utilization of the
statutory injunction by every Government agency as a means of enforcing its legislation."
Emphasis will be placed here on these agencies and the three mentioned in note 8
infra, since their experiences typify those of other agencies armed with the statutory in-
junction. Among the latter are the Market Administrator of the Department of Agricul-
ture, 50 STAT. 246 (1937), 7 U.S.C. § 608a(6) (1940), and the Civil Aeronautics Board,
52 STAT. 1025 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 647 (1940). The Interstate Commerce Commission
possesses similar authority under the Motor Carrier Act, 1935, 49 STAT. 564 (1935), 49
U.S.C. § 322(b) (1940), but the injunction authorized by the Interstate Commerce Act,
34 STAT. 591 (1906), 49 U.S.C. § 16(12) (1940), is more aldn to a judicial decree en-
forcing "cease and desist" orders issued after formal agency proceedings.
8. The Wheeler-Lea Act, 52 STAT. 114 (1938), amended the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act, 38 STAT. 717 (1914), to give the FTC power to seek a temporary injunction
against false advertising or misbranding of food, drugs, and cosmetics, 15 U.S.C. §53
(1940). The 1938 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 52 STAr. 1043 (1933), 21
U.S.C. § 332 (1940) (administered by the Federal Security Administrator), added the
injunction to the previous Act's sanctions. The Taft-Hartley Act, 61 STAT. 146 (1947),
29 U.S.C.A. § 160 (j), (1) (Supp. 1947), made a temporary injunction against unfair
labor practices available pending final NLRB decision (these statutes are hereinafter,
referred to by U.S.C. section number only).
9. The Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b), and the Securities Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78u(e), authorize the SEC to seek an injunction against anyone who "is engaged
or about to engage" in violative acts, and admonish the courts that "upon proper showing"
an injunction shall be granted. This is a far cry from the Emergency Price Control Act's
mandate that "upon a showing by the Administrator that such person has engaged or is
about to engage in any such [violative] acts or practices a permanent or temporary in-
junction, restraining order, or other order shall be granted without bond." 50 U.S.C.
" 1948] 1025
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Showing required.
While an agency must establish the applicability of its statute 10 and either
past, existing, or imminent violation thereof," statutory provision for an
injunction materially modifies the showing traditionally demanded of plain-
tiffs seeking such a decree in equity. The courts have held that legislative
authorization disposes of the requirement that lack of adequate remedy at
law be alleged.' 2 A showing that "irreparable injury" threatens is usually
unnecessary, although some courts cautiously cite prospective danger to
"the public interest" as grounds for granting a decree.' 3 And a showing by
the agency that its statute prescribes a special procedure for challenging a
APr. §925(a) (Supp. 1946). With ingenious judicial statesmanship, courts have equated
these two provisions by (a) holding that mere past violation justifies issuing an injunction
to the SEC because it gives rise to an inference of future violation (see note 19 inlra),
and (b) reading judicial discretion into the apparently mandatory OPA provision (see
note 17 infra). The Fair Labor Standards Act provision that federal courts "shall have
jurisdiction, for cause shown,.., to restrain violations," 29 U.S.C. §217, has been
similarly interpreted, as have most of the other statutes cited in notes 7 and 8 supra.
Legislative approval of extending the SEC provisions may be inferred from the "man-
datory" clauses later included in the SEC-administered Investment Companies Act, 54
STAT. 842, 15 U.S.C. § 80 a-41 (e) (1940), and Investment Advisers Act, 54 STAT. 853,
15 U.S.C. § 80 b-9 (e) (1940).
10. E.g., Walling v. Northwestern-Hanna Fuel Co., 67 F. Supp. 833 (D. Minn.
1946) (Wage and Hour). But the defendant bears the burden of proving that he comes
within an authorized exemption, Walling v. Morris, 155 F.2d 832 (C.C.A. 6th 1946),
SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co., 95 F.2d 699 (C.C.A. 9th 1938), or that classification
of his product was erroneous, United States v. Ridgeland Creamery Co., 47 F. Supp.
145 (W.D.Wis. 1942) (Agricultural Market Administrator).
11. E.g., SEC v. Macon, 28 F.Supp. 127, 130 (D.Colo. 1939) (past violation). A
temporary injunction usually is denied where there are sharp issues of fact, e.g., Bowles
v. Bernstein, 66 F.Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) (OPA). But ef. the Taft-Hartley Act,
29 U.S.C.A. § 160 (j) (I) (Supp. 1947), where the criterion seems to be only whether
there is "reason to believe" that certain proscribed unfair labor practices exist. See
Douds v. Local 294, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 75 F. Supp. 414, 418
(N.D.N.Y. 1947) (NLRB).
12. This principle has been universally applied by the federal courts. E.g., SEC v.
Jones, 85 F.2d 17 (C.C.A. 2d 1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 581 (1936). Courts which
still term the statutory injunction an "extraordinary remedy" apparently refer not to this
traditional requirement but to their discretionary power to deny relief. See, e.g, Walling
v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 159 F.2d 395, 399 (C.C.A. 4th 1946).
13. E.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) (anti-
trust); Henderson v. Burd, 133 F.2d 515 (C.C.A. 2d '1943) (OPA) ; Fleming v. Salem
Box Co., 38 F. Supp. 997 (D.Ore. 1940) (Wage and Hour). Occasionally a court will
grant a decree on the basis of irreparable injury, as in FTC v. Thomsen-King & Co., 109
F.2d 516, 519 (C.C.A. 7th 1940). A few courts have invoked this requirement to bar a
temporary mandatory injunction which would afford complete relief, as in United States
v. Adler's Creamery, 107 F.2d 987 (C.C.A. 2d 1939) (but permanent mandatory injunc-
tion subsequently granted to Market Administrator without such showing, 110 F.2d 482
(1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 657 (1940)). Contra: United States v. Andrews, 26 F.
Supp. 123 (D. Mass. 1939).
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regulation's validity curbs judicial power to deny injunctive relief on grounds
that the regulation imposes undue hardship. 14
But the tentacles of equity are not completely disengaged by statute: the
agency still must show possibility of future violation, for the injunction's
purpose is to prevent, not to punish.1 5 Even in the face of the apparently
mandatory provision in the Emergency Price Control Act for an injunction
upon showing of past violation,1 6 the Supreme Court held in Hechl v. Bowles 17
that judges retained discretion to refuse an injunction which they found un-
necessary to assure the defendant's future compliance. Its affirmation of
this equitable prerogative, however, was not unqualified: the Court cautioned
that judges must not administer the Act grudgingly and that standards of
public interest should supplant those of private litigation." In line with
these admonitions, courts have usually lightened the agency's burden by
drawing from past violations an inference that injunctive relief is necessary
to prevent future disobedience, with discretionary denial limited to cases
where the defendant overcomes this inference by clearly reliable promises
14. United States v. Ruzicka, 329 U.S. 287 (1946) (impropriety of Market Adminis-
trator's order no defense, since statute prescribes appeal to Secretary of Agriculture) ;
Pearson v. Walling, 138 F.2d 655, 657-8 (C.C.A. 8th 1943), cert. denied, 21 U.S. 775
(1944) (review of regulation limited to prescribed procedure) ; Bowles v. Meyers, 149 F2d
440 (C.C.,. 4th 1945) (only Emergency Court of Appeals can consider validity of OPA
regulation); cf. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
Another chancery doctrine that falls before a statute is equity's traditional ban
against collecting debts past due: e.g., Chapman v. United States, 139 F2d 327 (C.C.A.
8th 1943) (order to pay milk producers' settlement fund held not void in equity, although
exposing defendant to imprisonment for debt through contempt proceedings).
15. E.g., Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311,326 (1928).
16. See note 7 supra. Under statutes including modifying clauses like "upon proper
showing" or "for cause shown", courts have ample leeway to apply discretion. But the
court cannot, as in an action for a declaratory judgment, refuse to decide the issue raised.
Walling v. Mid-Continent Pipe Line Co., 143 F2d 303 (C.C . 10th 1944).
17. 321 U.S. 321 (1944), reversing 137 F.2d 6S9 (App.D.C. 1943). The Court
maneuvered the camel of discretion through the proverbial needle's eye by holding that
provision for an alternative "other order" ("a permanent or temporary injunction, re-
straining order, or other order shall be granted without bond") indicated that Congress
did not intend to prohibit that traditional judicial discretion. Id. at 330.
Whether it would be unconstitutional for Congress to remove this prerogative com-
pletely has not yet been decided. In the Hecht case there is no clear intimation that such
a modification would be barred by U.S. CoNsT. Art. III. Congress can prescribe penalties
in actions at law, and it may be questioned whether equitable origin gives injunctive
relief a perpetually sacrosanct status. On the other hand, legislative tampering with the
basic equity discretion of a court created under U.S. Co,;sT. Art. III might be held an
unconstitutional restriction on judicial power. For a possible intimation to that effect,
see the concurring opinion of Stone, C.J., in NLRB v. Cheney California Lumber Co.,
327 U.S. 385, 390 (1946).
18. 321 U.S. 321 at 331. The value of this oft-cited phrasing was appreciated by the
OPA: "The decision in the Hecht case did not impair the value of the injunction....
On the contrary, it probably strengthened this sanction.... The Supreme Court made
it clear that the courts must assume a positive responsibility in exercising their dis-
cretion." OPA MA2UAL § 9-6602.09B (2) (1946).
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that violations will not recur. 19 Accompanied by such judicial cooperation,
judicial discretion has provided a valuable safeguard against misuse of the
remedy without seriously marring effective enforcement.
The showing by which a defendant can successfully convince the court
that no injunction is necessary varies with the kaleidoscope of judicial discre-
tion, but three fragments consistently reappear in the pattern of decisions:
whether violations have been promptly and effectively discontinued, whether
these violations were committed in good faith, and whether in the court's
opinion a defendant's attitude and reputation lend credence to his promise
of future compliance. 0
The defendant must meet the first of these criteria by showing bona fide
discontinuance of illegal activity at least prior to trial 2 -- and generally be-
fore the complaint is filed 22-or he has little prospect of escaping injunction.
19. It was by this device that the Securities Exchange Act provisions had been ex-
tended to permit injunctions despite discontinuance of violations. See note 9 supra. In
Otis & Co. v. SEC, 106 F.2d 579 (C.C.A. 6th 1939), the court reasoned that without
such an extension "the injunction provided for would be a remedy of slight efficacy....
The necessary investigation would nearly always have warned the dealer to desist." It
flatly rejected the contrary rationale of SEC v. Torr, 87 F.2d 446 (C.C.A. 2d 1937)
(temporary injunction), but even the Torr case may be reconciled on its facts, for there
the court stressed that "the circumstances fail to support any reasonable inference" of
future violation, SEC v. Torr, supra at 450. See note 32 infra.
Courts have drawn a similar inference from violations of the Fair Labor Standards
Act. E.g., Fleming v. Tidewater Optical Co., 35 F.Supp. 1015, 1017 (E.D.Va. 1940)
(injunction granted even though no violations after nstiitution of investigation) ; cf. Wall-
ing v. Fairmont Creamery Co., 139 F.2d 318 (C.C.A. 8th 1943) (violations, even though
discontinued, form prima facie case precluding summary denial of injunction). And the
OPA announced on the basis of its experience that "the defendant has the burden of
showing, if he can, that in spite of his past violations an injunction will have no tendency
to lessen the chance that he will violate." OPA MANUAL § 9-6602.09C (6) (1946).
20. Although these criteria will be treated separately for purposes of presentation,
many of the cases cited involve all three questions. Decisions depend on the degree to
which each condition is established and the weight attached thereto by the court. Certain
agencies deal with problems which are not subject to criteria of discontinuance or past
good faith: the NLRB and FTC, for example, presumably would not seek a temporary
injunction where the illegal activity had been effectively discontinued, although that is-
sue may be raised by discontinuance after the suit is initiated (see note 26 infra). And
under the Food and Drug Act good faith is no defense (see note 35 bnfra).
21. E.g., Walling v. Panther Creek Mines, 148 F.2d 604 (C.C.A. 7th 1945) (denial
is reversible error). There also must be reasonable indications that the activity will not
be resumed. Bowles v. Cudahy Packing Co., 154 F.2d 891 (C.C.A. 3d 1946) (no changes
made to prevent recurrence) ; SEC v. Thomasson Panhandle Co., 145 F.2d 408 (C.C.A.
10th 1944) (violative schemes terminated, but similar promotion initiated after complaint
filed). The only major exception to the rule is an irreducible minimum of violations, as
in Hecht v. Bowles, supra note 17 (employee errors in pricing and listing).
22. Belated discontinuance savors of cessation under pressure of suit. Walling v.
Helmerich & Payne, 323 U.S. 37 (1944) (after complaint filed) ; Fleming v. Jacksonville
Paper Co., 128 F2d 395 (C.C.A. 5th 1942), aff'd, 317 U.S. 564 (1943) (six weeks before
complaint filed) ; see Hecht v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 327 (1944). The only major excep-
tion is where the defendant so effectively changes his position that the court is convinced
(Vol. 57: 10231028
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Wliere a corporation has been dissolved under pressure of suit, the individuals
responsible for its offenses or a successor organization may still be enjoined.2 3
But a strong showing of voluntary discontinuance materially bolsters the
defendant's promise of compliance. In actions for a temporary injunction,
where the main issue is whether violations threaten pendente lite, mere dis-
continuance antedating the complaint may suffice.2 4 A permanent injunc-
tion, while seldom averted by such a minimum showing, may similarly be
denied where the last violation occurred long before litigation commenced
or where the practice was discontinued promptly upon warning by the
agency.2 5 Even in the absence of such alacrity, a defendant may avoid judi-
cial prohibition by a showing that he has "effectively" altered his position
and adopted measures "adequate" to insure compliance--criteria sufficiently
vague to give the court wide leeway in determining whether its mandate is
necessary to forestall possible resumption of illegal activity.
he will comply. See note 26 infra. An OPA injunction was not necessarily barred by
amendment of a regulation which raised the ceiling above the previously violative price,
on the grounds that possible violation of the new provisions might be indicated. Bowles
v. May Hardwood Co., 140 F.2d 914 (C.C.A. 6th 1944) (but injunction was subsequently
denied; see note 40 infra); cf. FTC v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 304 U.S. 257
(1938) ("cease and desist" order). Contra: Bowles v. Swift & Co., 56 F.Supp. 679, 631
(D.Del. 1944) (reasoning of May case rejected). But termination of a statute precludes
an injunction, for there is nothing left to violate.
23. Bowles v. Carothers, 152 F.2d 603 (C.C.A. 5th 1945), cert. dcnicd, 323 U.S.
859 (1946) (business sold); Fleming v. Southern Kraft Corp., 43 F.Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y.
1942) (merger); cf. "Walling v. James V. Reuter, Inc., 321 U.S. 671 (1944).But dissolu-
tion remains an indication that violations will not recur. See note 26 infra.
24. "If violations have discontinued it is ne-t to impossible to procure a temporary
restraining order or a temporary injunction, unless we are able to show clearly and
affirmatively that a threat to violate.., the statute is both immediate and actual. This
is most difficult to do since it involves proof of intent to violate." Communication to the
YAiE LAw JouanA.L from Mr. John J. Babe, Assistant Solicitor, Department of Labor,
Jan. 21, 1948, in Yale Law Library.
25. E.g., Bowles v.,,Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 149 F. 2d 545 (C.C.A. 7th 1945)
(defendant volunteered information on activities to OPA and discontinued them promptly
when told they were in violation) ; Walling v. T. Buettner & Co., 133 F.2d 305 (C.C.A.
7th 1943), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 771 (1943) (company replaced and completely ceased
using home-workers 81 days before suit entered) ; SEC v. Downs, 1 S.E.C. Jud. Dec. 135
(D. Colo. 1936) (last alleged violation occurred seven months before complaint filed).
26. New labor contracts conforming to the Fair Labor Standards Act are considered
conclusive evidence that the defendant will not again violate. E.g., Walling v. Shenandoah-
Dives Mining Co., 134 F2d 395 (C.C-. 10th 1943) (violations over three-year period
terminated by new contract six months after suit initiated) ; cf. Douds v. Wine, Liquor
& Distillery Workers Union, 75 F.Supp. 447, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (NLRB; labor dis-
pute settled after petition filed). Practical steps to prevent recurrence of violations also
may offset delay, Walling v. Associated Truck Lines, 57 F.Supp. 943 (W.D."Mich. 1944),
as may leaving the business completely, Bowles v. Minish, 56 F.Supp. 153 (S.D.Ala.
1944). But the latter changes are far from conclusive, particularly where previous viola-
tions were committed in bad faith. See cases cited in note 23 supra, and SEC v. Lawson,
24 F.Supp. 360, 365 (D.Md. 1938) (defendant enjoined even though he dissolved broker-
102919481
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An equally important criterion, even though "willfulness" need not be
established,21 is whether past violations were committed in good faith, 21 The
"second offender" against whom judicial prohibition was previously denied
has little chance of escaping with continued immunity.29 Where the defend-
ant's promise of compliance need endure only for the short span of a tempor-
ary injunction, requirements of good faith may be satisfied if the infraction
was unintentional." But for a permanent injunction the standard is high.
While subjective good faith is important, the best of intentions must be bol-
stered by objective indicia of reasonable efforts to insure compliance. Thus
the defendant must show that he has been diligent to ascertain the correct
interpretation of#the statute or regulation,3 and reliance on unauthorized
advice given by agency subordinates will not be accepted as sufficient per se. "
In addition, practical steps must have been taken to carry out the regulatory
mandate.3 3 Where good faith is thus established, however, the novelty or
complexity of a regulation may lead the court to excuse minor infractions,8 4
age business and paid debts after complaint filed; "there is no legal obstacle to his [re-
suming business], however clear his present intention may be to the contrary.").
27. In the field of regulatory legislation, at least, requirements of willfulness may be
satisfied where violation is "intentional" rather than "accidental", and no "evil purpose"
need be shown. E.g., Zimberg v. United States, 142 F.2d 132, 138 (C.C.A. 1st 1944), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 712 (1944). When willfulness is thus established, an injunction almost
invariably issues. E.g., Bowles v. Weitz, 64 F.Supp. 829 (W.D. Pa. 1946). The one ex-
ception would be denial based on effective discontinuance per se. See note 26 .vpra.
28. Good faith may not be decisive, but "if made manifest, it may be a substantial
element to be considered." Bowles v. Huff, 146 F2d 428, 431 (C.C.A. 9th 1944).
29. E.g., Castle v. Walling, 153 F.2d 923 (C.C.A. 5th 1946).
30., E.g., Bowles v. Cunningham, 61 F.Supp. 162 (W.D.Pa. 1945). But see Hender-
son v. C. Thomas Stores, 48 F.Supp. 295, 303 (D.Minn. 1942).
31. Bowles v. Lenko, 64 F.Supp. 592 (W.D.Pa. 1946) (never communicated with
OPA to determine proper rentals); cf. Walling v. Kerr, 47 F.Supp. 852 (E.D.Pa. 1942)
(injunction granted where defendant failed to comply with wage order for industry
though Administrator previously failed to advise of status upon request). But such agency
errors are a factor in determining a defendant's good faith. E.g., Bowles v. Arlington
Furniture Co., 148 F.2d 467, 472 (C.C.A. 7th 1945) (OPA failed to make pre-sale in-
spection as requested).
32. Such misplaced reliance, without following the prescribed interpretative procedure,
may be held an enjoinable failure to exercise practical precautions, Bowles v. Sago, 65
F.Supp 178 (W.D.Pa. 1946). Erroneous advice by an agency subordinate, however, may
count heavily in favor of the defendant. Apparently this was an important factor in SEC
v. Torr, 87 F.2d 446, 449 (C.C.A. 2d 1937) (temporary injunction denied; see note 19
supra), but, notwithstanding, a permanent injunction was subsequently granted, 22 F.Supp,
602, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
33. E.g., Bowles v. 870 Seventh Avenue Corp., 150 F.2d 819, 823 (C.C.A. 2d 1945),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 780 (1946) ("negligence of its employees on repeated occasions in
adherence to price ceilings seems to us to have required injunctive relief.") ; Bowles v.
Pechersky, 64 F.Supp. 641 (W.D.Pa. 1946) (injunction warranted by 3/2. overcharge on
soup, despite neighborhood grocer's belief he was complying); Bowles v. Sneider, 62
F.Supp. 916 (D.Mass. 1945). But cf. Bowles v. McCrady Construction Co., 64 F.Supp.
582 (W.D.Pa. 1946).
34. Walling v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 159 F.2d 395 (C.C.A. 4th 1946) (substantial
1030 [Vol. 57 : 1023
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and a minimum of unavoidable violations will not warrant an injunction.
Personal elements in each situation comprise a third category of considera-
tions materially affecting the court's exercise of its discretion. Even where
discontinuance and past good faith are established, a promise of compliance
invariably will be vitiated by unyielding refusal to accept the correct inter-
pretation of a regulation or by over-aggressive litigation." On the other
hand, the trustworthiness of the defendant is apparently a decisive factor
in borderline cases, even though the judge's confidence in the defendant's
reliability cannot alone justify denial of an injunction.Yr Similarly, while
hardship in compliance theoretically may not enter judicial calculations un-
less the validity of a regulation is at stake,33 courts frequently "balance the
equities" in the sense of considering whether future violation is sufficiently
compliance with confusing regulation, and good faith effort to determine meaning);
Bowles v. Virginia Hotel, 55 F.Supp. 1013 (W.D.La. 1944) (diligent efforts to comply) ;
Walling v. Gulf States Paper Corp., 53 F.Supp. 619 (N.D-Ala. 1942), aff'd, 143 F.2d
301 (C.C.A. 5th 1944) (in relation to total activity, violations "so small as not to form
a proper basis for an injunction!"). A company may escape injunction where violations
by subordinates were directly contrary to instructions of its officers and action has been
taken to prevent recurrence. Walling v. Woodruff, 49 F.Supp. 52 (M.D.Ga. 1942). But
mere instructions, without any effort to enforce them will not suffice. Learoot v. Inter-
state Bakeries Corp., 146 F2d 325 (C.C.A. 8th 1945).
35. E.g., Hecht v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944) ; Bowles v. Weiss, 66 F.Supp. 366, 370
(W.D.Pa. 1946) (injunction "would have no effect by way of insuring better compliance!'
because defendants doing best they can). The single exception is an injunction under the
Federal Food, Drugs and Cosmetics Act, as in United States v. Lazere, 56 F.Supp. 730
(N.D.Iowa 1944) (no defense that defendant doing best he can; Congress lays down ab-
solute prohibition).
36. A number of variations on this theme are found in Walling v. Helmerich & Payne,
323 U.S. 37 (1944) ; SEC v. Okin, 139 F.2d 87 (C.C.A. 2d 1943) ; Walling v. Hamner, 64
F. Supp. 690 (W.D. Va. 1946) ; Walling v. Builders' Veneer & Wcodwork Co., 45 F.Supp.
808 (E.D. Wis. 1942). At the same time, an injunction is less likely to issue when the
defendant is clearly willing to abide'by the court's decision as to the legality of a practice.
Cf. Walling v. Bibb Manufacturing Co., 6 Wage Hour Cases 273 (LD. Ga. 1946)
(court declared activity illegal but denied injunction because satisfied that defendant
would comply).
37. Courts occasionally reveal how important this usually implicit motivation can
be. See Lenroot v. Kemp, 153 F2d 153 (C.C-.A 5th 1946), rcvcrsing 59 F.Supp. 605
(S.D.Miss. 1945). The trial judge had expatiated, "Ordinarily, the violations in this
case have been such as would require the issuance of an injunction. However, having
seen the defendants ;. . and knowing their ... reputation for substantial, outstanding
citizens of the state, I cannot believe that these men will violate this law in the future."
Id. at 156. But the appellate court bluntly emphasized that judicial respect for the defend-
ant cannot alone forestall an injunction.
Conversely, a defendant's reputation may be such that a court feels he cannot be
trusted to comply. See Koeppe v. SEC, 95 F2d 550, 553 (C.C-.A 7th 1938) ("contrite
heart" and promises to comply need not be, and are not, believed), and Walling v. Peavy-
Wilson Lumber Co., 49 F.Supp. 846, 894 (W.D.La. 1943) ("Though we ... recognize
the fine executive virtues of the present head of the company, we believe that because of
his temperament and disposition it would be better to issue the writs.").
- 38. See note 14 supra.
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probable to outweigh an injunction's potential injury to the defendant's
reputation. 9 Sympathy for struggling businessmen looms large in the ratio
decidendi when a judge is hostile to the statute or distrusts the "all-powerful
Administrator." 40
While variations in each case preclude inexorable rules as to when an in-
junction will be granted, these three criteria which the defendant must meet
have shaped judicial discretion to make a statutory injunction available to
the agency within reasonable limits. 4' A highly important by-product of
this availability has been the willingness of defendants in a vast majority of
cases to consent to entry of a decree, thereby obviating full-dress litigation. 2
39. Equities in the traditional sense theoretically cannot be weighed, U.S. v. San
Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940), but it would be naive to assume that they do not enter
into judicial calculations. Cf. Bowles v. Trunz, 66 F.Supp. 363 (E.D.N.Y. 1945) (court
cannot consider fairness of regulation, but temporary injunction denied in the "interests
of justice"). Courts frequently repeat the axioms that "the equities must favor the
plaintiff" and that "more good than harm" must result to justify issuance of an injunction,
but in most cases these issues seem to boil down to whether the judge finds a "reasonable
likelihood of violations in the future." E.g., Walling v. Gulf States Paper Corp., 53
F.Supp. 619, 624 (N.D.Ala. 1942), aff'd, 143 F.2d 301 (C.C.A. 5th 1942); cf. Brown v.
Purvin, 52 F.Supp. 348, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). A kindred equitable axiom, "lie who
seeks equity must do equity," was invoked as a ground for denying an injunction in
Wailing v. McCracken County Peach Growers Ass'n, 50 F.Supp. 900 (W.D.Ky. 1943).
And in Bowles v. Elzea, 59 F.Supp. 1012 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), the court considered seriously,
but rejected the contention that the OPA came into court with "unclean hands". While
these axioms persist, they have seldom changed the course of decision.
40. Walling v. Lacy, 51 F.Supp. 1002, 1005 (D.Colo. 1943) (widow operating small
printing shop promised tearfully to comply, and "surely the all-powerful Administrator
could ask for nothing more.") ; and see Walling v. T. Buettner & Co., 133 F.2d 306, 308
(C.C.A. 7th 1943) (reversing issuance of injunction), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 771 (1943) :
"Employers . . . should not be harassed by the processes of a court of equity coercing
them to do what they are willing to do and trying to do voluntarily." The OPA also
received its share of verbal lashings: see Porter v. Rushing, 65 F.Supp. 759, 760 (W.D.
Ark. 1946) ($9 rent overcharge in year held de ininimis) : the court must "prevent tile
over-zealous agent.., of the government from using the temporary authority lodged in
him as an instrument of oppression of the weak."
41. Even where an injunction is denied, the court may afford lesser relief. E.g.,
Bowles v. C.S.Smith Metropolitan Market Co., 59 F.Supp. 895 (S.D.Cal. 1945) (order
to employ additional inspectors). A common practice was to hold an OPA case on the
docket, with leave granted the Administrator to move for an injunction if the defendant
violated during a prescribed period. E.g., Bowles v. May Hardwood Co., 155 F.2d 264
(C.C.A. 6th 1946). And in Walling v. Florida Hardware Co., 142 ,F.2d 444 (C.C.A. 5th
1944), the defendant was given 30 days to correct its faulty system of keeping wage
records; upon compliance within that time, an injunction was denied.
42. In the fiscal year 1945, for example, 83% of the 417 injunctive actions under the
Fair Labor Standards Act and 79.6% of the 20,565 OPA civil cases (of which the large
majority were for injunctions) resulted in consent decrees. AxN. REi,. Di. ADM. OFF.
U.S. COURTS 51 (1945). But the percentage may diminish as a program matures. See note
120 infra.
The judge is not required to enter an unjustified consent decree, Bowles v. Huff,
146 F.2d 428 (C.C.A. 9th 1944), but he cannot vacate such a decree without expression of
dissatisfaction by the parties, Bowles v. Dodge, 141 F.2d 969 (C.C.A. 9th 1944), and any
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As a result, most agencies have been successful in more than 95 percent of
their completed injunctive actions.43
As with the issuance of an injunction, the scope of' the decree which is
available depends on the court's discretion." Recognizing the agencies' need
right of subsequent challenge to its scope is considered waived by consent. SEC v. Jones,
85 F.2d 17 (C.C.A. 2d 1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 581 (1936).
In addition to the difficulty of persuading the court to deny an injunction, tvio other
factors may influence the defendant to accept a consent decree. (1) "The shame resulting
from this order is sometimes mitigated and the corporation's face saved by taking a
consent decree. The corporation may insist that the consent decree is not an admission
that it violated the law." Sutherland, Is "White Collar Crime" Crime?, 10 Am. Socior.
REv. 132, 135 (1945). (2) He may feel that he is escaping heavier penalties. The Wage
and Hour Adimistrator, for instance, may refrain from seeking an injunction against
interstate transportation of "hot goods" produced by underpaid workers (see 29 U.S.C.
§ 217) if the defendant consents to a decree ordering compliance and repays back wages.
2 MLS 90:101.
43. This percentage excludes withdrawals by the agencies but includes consent de-
crees:
OPA injunction suits (1942-May 1947, 22 OPA Q. RFE. 17):
Preliminary injunctions granted ......................... 2,970
Permanent injunctions granted ........................... 48,S9 93.8%
Total denied ........................................... 1,606 -
Withdrawn ............................................ 16,3S9
Wage & Hour (1933-June 1946, figures supplied by Dept. of Labor) :
Won (permanent & preliminary) ........................... 4,741197
Lost " . ............ 951 '9
Withdrawn ............................................... 142
Statistics indicate, however, that in contested cases the agency's record may be far less
imposing, as in the fiscal year 1941, AxN. REP. W. & H. Drv. 60 (1941) :
Granted after contest ....................................... 10 59%0
Denied after contest ........................................ 7
Issued by consent and default ................................ 1,595
W ithdrawn ................................................ 7
SEC (1933-Jume 1947, figures supplied by SEC) (precise disposition is inclued to
show the various possible fates of an injunction) :
Judgment by Consent ............................................. 959
" by Court ............................................... 142
" Pro Confesso ........................................... 32
"1 by Default ............................................. 33
Total issued ............................................ 1166
Judgment denied ................................................ 7
Abated .......................................................... 1
Vacated ......................................................... 11
Prosecution stayed on stipulation to discontinue violation ............ 3




Total instituted but not issued ........................... 303
44. Appellate courts are particularly loath to substitute their discretion on "scope!'
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for an order sufficiently broad to prevent evasion, courts have usually co-
operated by prohibiting all violations found to be of the "general type" pre-
viously committed or "fairly anticipated," 41 though on occasion judicial
foresight as to what might be anticipated has seemed somewhat myopic. 4
But judges understandably object to omnibus decrees which unduly expose
the defendant to contempt proceedings; accordingly, statute-wide injunc-
tions are granted only where bad faith is evident or "the public interest"
requires drastic action.47
Availability relative to that of other sanctions.
The limited showing necessary for a statutory injunction and the speed
with which such relief may be obtained make it much more versatile than
other weapons in the enforcement arsenal. As a milder remedy requiring
no proof of "willfulness", 48 its availability is accentuated in comparison with
that of criminal prosecution.4 9 An injunction avoids the uncertainties of
for that of the original tribunal. E.g., Bowles v. Town Hall Grill, 145 F.2d 680 (C.C.A.
1st 1944) (see note 46 infra). For a more complete treatment of "scope" than is possible
here, see Note, 54 YALE L. J. 141 (1944).
45. Prescribed for "cease and desist" orders in NLRB v. Express Publishing Co.,
312 U.S. 426, 437 (1941), and May Department Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376
(1944), these criteria also govern the scope of injunctions. E.g., Bowles v. Luster, 153
F.2d 382, 384 (C.C.A. 9th 1946). But the anti-trust injunction recently upheld in Inter-
national Salt Co. v. United States, 68 S.Ct. 12, 18 (1947), indicates that at least in this
related field some courts are willing to grant decrees broad enough to bar every major
evasive device.
46. A leading example is the notorious "chicken, lobster, and gin" case, where the
appellate court refused to broaden a decree beyond the three items on which a restaurant
had violated price ceilings. Bowles v. Town Hall Grill, 145 F.2d 680 (C.C.A. 1st 1944).
And f. Walling v. Sternberg Dredging Co., 64 F.Supp. 758 (E.D.Mo. 1946) (decree
limited to group of employees previously underpaid); Porter v. Lux, 157 F,2d 756
(C.C.A. 9th 1946) (injunction of limited duration, with clause permitting OPA to prove
subsequent need for extension).
47. See Fleming v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 128 F.2d 395 (C.C.A. 5th 1942), aff'd,
317 U.S. 564 (1943) (statute-wide injunction modified-a factor responsible for defend-
ant's subsequent acquittal of contempt, 69 F.Supp. 599 (S.D.Fla. 1947)). But flagrant
violations lead courts to anticipate infraction of unrelated provisions of the statute. E.g.,
Bowles v. Montgomery Ward, 143 F.2d 38 (C.C.A. 7th 1944) (statute-wide injunction).
Whether failure to keep price records would justify injunction against price violations was
a bone of contention: Compare Bowles v. Leithold, 155 F.2d 124 (C.C.A. 3d 1945), cert.
denied, 327 U.S. 794 (1946) (granted where violations willful) with Bowles v. Sacher,
146 F.2d 186 (C.C.A. 2d 1944) (denied; no mention of willfulness).
48. For conviction under most regulatory statutes, willfulness must still be estab-
lished. E.g., Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78ff (a) (1940). See note 27 .supra. A
rare exception is the Federal Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. § 333, under
which intent is 'no part of the crime" even though it opens the door to higher penalties.
Triangle Candy Co. v. United States, 144 F.2d 195, 199 (C.C.A. 9th 1944). But in any
event the difficulty of convicting reputable citizens makes "willfulness" an obstacle much
greater than its current definition would indicate. See note 2 supra.
49. Compare the statistics on injunctions in note 43 supra with the following figures
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jury trial and averts the possibility that an agency's case may be impaled
on the spikes of criminal procedure." It is entertained more promptly by
the courts and under many statutes may be initiated by the agency's own
legal staff, whereas criminal prosecution must await the pleasure of a United
States Attorney.5'
In some situations, moreover, injunctions may be obtained more easily
than the other civil remedies authorized for certain agencies. For example,
condemnation under the Food and Drug Act is permitted only after adulter-
ated goods have entered interstate commerce, whereas an injunction may
forestall their shipment. 52 License suspension under the OPA was limited in
on federal criminal defendants:
SEC: 1934-June 1947, 13 SEC ANN. REP. 228 (1947):
Convicted: .......... 1,065 81.% (but in 89.6% of the 371 cases
Acquitted: ........... 2361 'completed as to one or more de-
Proceedings dismissed fendants, at least one convic-
by U. S. Attorneys: .. 552 tioa has been obtained.)
OPA: 1942-May 1947, 22 OPA Q. REP. 17 (1947):
Convicted: ................................ 11,60D 934%r
Acquitted: ............................. 815 '
Withdrawn: ............................... 1,500
A major factor in OPA's record of convictions was the care with which the agency
restricted prosecution to e-xceptionally flagrant cases. See note 108 infra. During the
fiscal year 1945, pleas of guilty or nolo contendere were entered by 3,937 defendants, while
only 520 were tried by court or jury. In these 520 cases the OPA was far less success-
ful: 196, or 37.7%, were acquitted. ANN. REP'. Din.. As. Or. U.S. Counas 57, 113
(1945).
During the same year the Wage and Hour Division instituted criminal action against
133 defendants: 90 were convicted, of whom 81 had entered pleas of guilty or nolo con-
tendere; charges against 28 were dismissed, and 5 were acquitted. Id. at 113. Between
Oct. 1938 and July 1946, 685 Wage-Hour prosecutions were instituted, as compared with
4,978 suits for injunction. Child Labor violations have led to prosecution in 213 cases as
compared with 452 injunctive actions (statistics supplied by Dept. of Labor).
50. OPA listed six procedural criteria for choosing the sanction appropriate to a case:
(1) possibility of adequate disposition; (2) questions of proof and evidence; (3) difficulty
of clearing through the Department of Justice; (4) speed with which results can be ob-
tained; (5) extent to which OPA attorneys control proceedings, see note 51 infra; (6)
whether remedy chosen involves jury trial. OPA MAuiAL § 9-1702.03 (1946). On all
of these counts the injunction is procedurally more desirable. Indicative of why the
agency preferred to avoid a jury is the fact that during the fiscal year 1945 43.8% of
the defendants tried on OPA criminal charges by a jury were acquitted, as compared with
only 21.7% of those tried by the court. ANN. REP. Din..m. OPF. U.S. Courrs 57
(1945).
51. Agencies such as the Department of Agriculture have no litigating staff and must
refer all cases to the Department of Justice. Attorneys for the OPA, SEC, Wage and
Hour Division, NLRB, and FTC may bring civil, but not criminal, actions. See, c.g., 8
SEC ANN. REP. 39 (1942), OPA MANUAL § 9-1701. This distinction is not merely
academic: (1) the process of "referral" is time-consuming; (2) the OPA, for e.-arnple,
found that "in some areas U.S. Attorneys were reluctant to proceed, with the result that
there was little or no effective enforcement in those areas." DuHL, OPA ENri.o nCsrr
Hissoay (unpublished document in National Archives, 1947).
52. E.g., United States v. Swift & Co., 53 F. Supp. 1018 (M.D.Ga. 1943). When the
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practice by its seemingly drastic nature and the delay-producing requirement
of previous warning notice "-difficulties not encountered in seeking an in-
junction. OPA treble damage penalties,54 unlike injunctions, could be
secured despite decontrol of an item or certainty of future compliance," but
penalties were limited by difficulties of proof and a one-year statute of limita-
tion." Injunctive relief, on the other hand, could not only be invoked more
promptly but could also make available ancillary restitution 11 compensating
adverse party is before the court, an injunction may be sought in the same suit as con-
demnation. See United States v. 184 Barrels Dried Whole Eggs, 53 F.Supp. 652, 653
(E.D.Wis. 1943) (entry of goods into interstate commerce in doubt). But condemnation
is not too difficult to secure: as an "in rem" proceeding it may be promptly instituted,
and no showing is required that adulteration was intentional or even that the adulterated
product is injurious to health. E.g., United States v. Two Bags, Each Containing 110
Pounds, Poppy Seeds, 147 F.2d 123 (C.C.A. 6th 1945).
53. 50 U.S.C.AP's. § 925(f) authorized the Administrator to issue licenses for all
sales subject to price control. Licenses could be suspended up to one year in a civil pro-
ceeding upon showing that the violator (1) had received an official "license warning
notice" for a previous infraction, and (2) had again breached the regulation after re-
ceipt of this notice. The Administrator was not required to establish willfulness or the
grounds for the warning notice, Gordon v. Porter, 155 F.2d 949 (C.C.A. 9th 1946), but
the remedy was regarded as "time-consuming and awkward", 5 OPA Q. Rra. 53 (1943),
and was a type of action new to both courts and OPA attorneys. See, in general, OPA
MANUAL § 9-1803.02 (1946). The sanction was infrequently invoked: OPA won 328
license suits, lost 66, and withdrew 442. 22 OPA Q. R x. 17 (1947).
54. See 50 U.S.C.APi,. §925(e). The 1944 amendment made the previously automatic
treble damages subject to the "Chandler defense" of past objective good faith, which
could reduce recovery to the amount of the overcharge. Between these boundaries courts
fixed the damages in their discretion. Bowles v. Goebel, 151 F.2d 671 (C.C.A. 8th 1945).
This sanction was frequently invoked by OPA and freely granted by the courts. See
22 OPA Q. REp. 17 (1947):
Adm'r's own Treble Damages suit on Adm'r's suit in place of consumer on
goods purchased "in course of trade other overcharges (authorized by
or business" (1942-May 1947): 1944 Amendment) (1944-May 1947)
Won ........ 6,303 Won ....... 13,869
Lost ........ 334 Lost ....... 605
Withdrawn .. 1,900 Withdrawn . 4,896
And the threat of these penalties facilitated informal disposition. In 1943 approximately
25,000 damage claims were settled, and an equal number were disposed of by "voluntary"
contribution. 8 OPA Q. REP. 70 (1944).
The Market Administrator also has authority (rarely used) to recover thrice the
value of fruit shipped in violation of interstate quotas. 7 U.S.C. § 608a (5).
55. See 20 OPA Q. REP. 74 (1947). Both sanctions could be sought jointly, and a
finding that injunction was unwarranted did not prejudice claims for damages. E.g., Star
Steel Supply Co. v. Bowles, 159 F.2d 812 (C.C.A. 6th 1947). Nor were treble damages
barred by previous issuance of an injunction. E.g., Woodbury v. Porter, 158 F.2d 194
(C.C.A. 8th 1946).
56. 50 U.S.C. APP. § 925 (e). See note 94 infra.
57. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946), upheld the remedy under
two theories: (1) "nothing is more clearly a part of the subject matter of a suit for an
injunction than the recovery of that . . . which has given rise to the necessity for in-
junctive relief"; (2) the OPA's "other order" clause. Id. at 399; see note 17 supra. But
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for injuries prior to that one-year period and requiring less precise computa-
tion of damages by the agency.
The availability of an injunction is less marked in comparison with that of
administrative sanctions such as "cease and desist" orders.rs The agency's
hearing branch will presumably be more sympathetic than many district
judges toward the enforcement program, and, on judicial review, administra-
tive findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.3
But in most situations requirements of notice and hearing,l as well as
inability to enforce some administrative orders prior to approval by the
Circuit Court of Appeals, 61 create delays not present in an injunctive action.
And the ancillary relief that an injunction permits can seldom be procured
administratively. 2
EFFECTIVENESS
While the ready availability of the statutory injunction aids enforcement
by facilitating application of a formal sanction, the ultimate value of this
without an injunction, "such a recovery could not be obtained... if an adequate legal
remedy were available." Ibid.
In contrast with OPA experience, the Wage and Hour Division has been granted
ancillary restitution in only a few contested actions, e.g., Walling v. O'Grady, 146 F.2d
422 (C.C.A. 2d 1944). But unless the statutory provision for double damages in suits by
employees, 29 U.S.C. § 216b, is held exclusive merely because there is no specific provi-
sion for recovery by the Administrator, the first ground of the Warncr decision seems
clearly applicable. The question has not been directly raised since that opinion, but resti-
tution is usually available in civil contempt proceedings (see note 75 infra), and has often
been embodied in consent decrees, e.g., Walling v. Miller, 138 F2d 629 (C.C.A. 8th
1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 784 (1944). In the fiscal year 1947, such relief was secured
in 14,748 cases handled administratively and in 160 consent decrees. Ax. RE. NV. & H.
Drv. 9 (1947).
58. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §45 (FTC); 29 U.S.C.A. § 160 (Supp. 1947)(NLRB).
Among the other important administrative sanctions are the SEC "stop-order", 15 U.S.C.
§ 77 h (d), which suspends the registration statement necessary to float an issue of se-
curities, and the SEC broker-dealer revocation order, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b), barring a
broker-dealer from over-the-counter securities transactions. For statistics on revocation
orders and other broker-dealer sanctions, see 13 SEC ANN. REP. 226 (1947). Extremely
useful to the OPA was the rationing suspension order which, though not specifically au-
thorized by statute, received judicial approval as a logical extension of the power to allo-
cate rationed commodities. L. P. Steuart & Bro. v. Bowles, 322 U. S. 398 (1944). The
agency's record before its hearing branch was 41,784 cases won, 4,743 lost, and 5,864 with-
drawn. 22 OPA Q. REP. 17 (1947).
59. See, e.g., the Securities and Securities Exchange Acts, 15 U.S.C. §§27i(a), 78y(a).
60. These requirements apply to all the sanctions enumerated in note 58 spra (but
in-practice announcement of a "stop-order" hearing instantaneously halts trading in that
security). In contrast, a temporary restraining order can be granted even without prior
notice if irreparable injury threatens. 38 STAT. 737 (1914), 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1940).
61. This difficulty is encountered primarily with "cease and desist" orders, e.g.,
NLRB orders, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) ; see SEN. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1947).
FTC orders become final if not appealed within 60 days. 15 U.S.C. § 45. Other sanctions
enumerated in note 58 supra are in force pending appeal, unless the court specifically
grants a "stay".
62. See note 104 infra.
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sanction must be measured in terms of its effectiveness in decreasing statu-
tory violation."3 Theoretically, an injunction's purpose as a preventive
remedy is fulfilled if the enjoined party obeys the court's order. But as one
court must have recognized when it pursued a late-lamented defendant into
purgatory with an injunction issued nunc pro tunc, each formal sanction
should perform the additional function of deterring other would-be violators
as well.64 To achieve either of these aims, an injunction must be followed by
effective detection of violations and substantial punishment therefor. For-
tunately, however, inadequate policing of decrees may be offset to some ex-
tent by .their psychological impact, which greatly increases the remedy's
total deterrent effect.
Detecting violations of injunctions.
Although a few types of infraction such as failure to submit records will
come to the agency's attention automatically, 5 it must rely primarily on re-
investigation and complaints to reveal violations of injunctions. In practice
the effectiveness of both methods is unfortunately limited.
Because of budgetary restrictions, few agencies have enough investigators
to follow adequately the activities of all those enjoined, without reducing
essential initial coverage. Although the problem is less acute where a periodic
63. Mandatory injunctions also serve the useful purpose of effecting positive action,
such as preparation of records.
64. U.S. v. Paddock, 68 F.Supp. 407 (W.D.Mo. 1946) (Food and Drug). The only
rational motive for this aberrational decision is to warn the public that not even ghosts
can misbrand drugs with impunity. The importance of deterrent effect is indicated in
Fleming v. Phipps, 35 1.Supp. 627 (D.Md. 1940), where the Wage and Hour Division
dropped the customary veil of legal jargon to urge issuance of an injunction because:
(1) failure to enjoin a defendant who admittedly (though unintentionally) had violated
the statute would encourage others to violate; (2) the agency's appropriation was inade-
quate to permit effective "policing" of that industry; and (3) an injunction would assist
the Administrator in subsequent litigation. But the court indignantly rejected this prag-
matic approach: "The special reasons urged ... for the injunction in this case seem to
be for indirect and collateral objectives rather than in accordance with the usual equity
rules. . . ." Id. at 630.
Nevertheless, judicial refusal to grant an injunction for the overt purpose of deter-
ring others does not mean that courts do not consider this additional attribute of an in-
junction, as witness the Paddock case. And certainly it is uppermost in the calculations
of agency officials: "We do not want to and cannot police every transaction or even
handle every violation which occurs .... We must select those cases which will have
maximum effect in bringing about better adherence to the regulations." Memorandumn to
OPA Regional Administrators from Chester Bowles, Jan. 31, 1945.
65. Mandatory injunctions are inherently easier to enforce. But only where the man-
date directs submission of money or records to the agency itself, as with payment to the
milk producers' settlement fund operated under the Market Administrator, will violation
"automatically" be detected. Even there, fraudulent computation may be difficult to un-
cover.
Also effective is constant agency scrutiny of the medium for violation. The FTC,
for example, conducts a continuouis survey of advertising, and the odds are slim that
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inspection is possible, like that of broker-dealers by the SEC," agencies like
the OPA and the Wage and Hour Division have been notoriously under-
staffed.7 And even where reinvestigation is feasible, detection may still be
difficult."5
Complaints revealing hidden violations, while useful to supplement sys-
tematic reinvestigation, are even more haphazard. Many victims fail to
report violations because of indifference, collusion, or fear of economic re-
prisal, 9 and when regulations are complex or shifting the agency cannot
educate all potential complainants to detect violation of their statutory
rights.7 0 Inaccurate or insignificant complaints are actively detrimental be-
cause they tie up investigative facilities better employed in planned enforce-
ment drives.71
violation by anyone enjoined from false advertising will slip through this dragnet. See
AxN. REP. FTC 61 (1946).
In an effort to make all of its "cease and desist orders" more fully "self-enforcing,"
the NLRB and FTC require submission of reports on steps taken to insure compliance
therewith. While such a device should be highly successful in channeling investigation by
these agencies, its usefulness in mass enforcement programs might be limited by the tre-
mendous volume of reports that would be required.
66. Even the SEC must rely primarily upon complaints to detect violations of fly-by-
night operators.
67. The number of OPA investigators never exceeded 3500--approimately one par
county. The inadequacy of this staff was such that there was little reinvestigation early
in the program. "It was felt that the mere issuance of the injunction would keep such
violators in line, at least for the time being, and that it was more important to investigate
other violators. Later on, . . . in order to maintain [the injunction's] effectiveness, it
became necessary to check upon compliance." Communication to the Ytax LAW Joumfa.=
from Thomas I. Emerson, formerly Deputy Administrator for Enforcement, OPA, Jan.
29, 1948, in Yale Law Library.
The Wage and Hour Division has only enough manpower to investigate annually
8% of the 550,000 establishments subject to its statute, as compared with a yearly turn-
over of approximately 9% among these establishments. In 1946, reinspections were
sharply reduced to enable broader initial coverage by this small staff. Ain;. REP. NV. & H.
Div. 16, 24 (1946). But some effort is apparently made to reinspect enjoined establish-
ments within a year.
68. For e-xcample, an overcharge on a set of underwear may be easily concealed by
sleight-of-hand book-keeping, and does not arouse the publicity attendant upon a cut-rate
offer of "blue-sky" mining stock.
69. See 10 OPA Q. RuP. 62 (1944): 'In some industries where violations are most
rampant there are no complaints at all, if only because buyers are afraid that they vill
be cut off from supply or because the buyers are themselves guilty of inducing over-
ceiling sales in their desire to obtain supplies." And even though unions are useful
watchdogs, the Wage and Hour Division in the fiscal year 1941 found 16,9S0 violations
through routine inspections in comparison with 14,513 discovered through investigation
of complaints. Amc. R . V. & H. Div. 43 (1941). But only ignorance of the SECs
existence or reluctance to reveal one's gullibility would bar complaint when a stoc:
swindle is detected.
70. OPA regulations, for example, were constantly in flu., and merchants as vell
as consumers often had difficulty in determining ceiling prices. See S OPA Q. RP. 61
(1943).
71. Each complaint must be followed by investigation, unless obviously groundless,
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Wherever malfeasance is unlikely to be detected by either complaints or
reinvestigation, as in the retail field under OPA, business-stopping sanctions
such as license suspension may be the only enforceable prohibitions. 2 But
generally detection has not been so inadequate as to result in disintegration
of injunction enforcement.73
Penalizing violations of injunctions.
If an injunction is to be effective, the detection of violations must lead to
penalties sufficiently onerous to make offenses unprofitable-a goal usually
sought in civil or criminal contempt proceedings?74 The civil remedy can
compensate a victim of the violation for injuries caused thereby and can
force compliance with the court's order by imprisonment or accruing fines
which must terminate when that is obeyed.75 While civil relief may also be
obtained in criminal contempt proceedings, the latter differ from their civil
counterpart in that unconditional penalties not terminating upon compliance
can be imposed.7 These penalties may be substantial, since contempt pro-
to avoid an appearance of lethargic enforcement. See ANN. REP'. W. & H. Div. 32
(1946). Frequently such investigations merely squander limited facilities; in 1941 only
70.6% of the wage-hour inspections pursuant to complaints revealed violations. ANN.
REP. W. & H. Div. 43 (1941). Even where complaints were warranted, the OPA found
that "effective enforcement can never be achieved by hopping from one complaint to an-
other." OPA MANUAL §9-6602.04 (1946). Much better results were achieved by
planned barrages which could "concentrate a sufficient number of trained enforcement
attorneys and' investigators." 9 OPA Q. RE'. 68 (1944). And witness the sigh of relief
heaved by the Wage and Hour Division when complaints began to decrease: "With the
complaint backlog no longer a serious problem, ...it is possible to approach the prob-
lem of national enforcement ...on a more scientific basis." ANN. REP. W. & H. Div.
32 (1946).
72. Violations of license suspension orders were easily detected, while in the retail
field "the task of policing an injunction would be insuperable." OPA MANUAL
§ 9-1803.02 C(2) (1946). This difficulty was enhanced by the necessity of relying pri-
marily on the amateur investigations of Community Price Panels to enforce retail com-
pliance, in order to permit concentration of highly trained professional investigators on
the more crucial manufacturing and wholesale levels. 7 OPA Q. REP. 83-4 (1944).
73. The shortcomings of detection facilities emphasize the truism that "in any en-
forcement project of considerable scope, reliance must be placed on voluntary compli-
ance." DUHL, op. cit. supra note 51. Cf. ENFORCEMENT OF THE PaoHMnTioN LAws, SEN.
Doc. No. 307, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. (1931).
74. Consideration of contempt will be limited to the framework within which agen-
cies invoke the sanction against injunctive violators. For an analysis of the generic prob-
lem, see Comment, 57 YALE L. J. 83 (1947).
75. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911), and Com-
ment, 57 YALE L. J. 83, 93, 100-6 (1947). Agencies are usually accorded the right to
bring proceedings for civil contempt, although the agency itself is not injured. E.g.,
Fleming v. Warshawsky & Co., 123 F.2d 622 (C.C.A. 7th 1941) (judgment for amount
of unpaid wages due, although employees "voluntarily" waived payment). Contra: Wall-
ing v. Crane, 158 F.2d 80 (C.C.A. 5th 1946).
76. United States v. United Mineworkers of America, 330 U.S. 258 (1947); Pen-
field Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585 (1947). Judicial confusion has frequently befogged the
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visions of the Judicial Code usually replace the penal restrictions of an
agency's statute with limits of sound discretion n-limits likely to expand
under the stress of a court's ire at failure to comply with its edict. Violations
of statutory injunctions have seldom resulted in exorbitant sentences, how-
ever, since judicial indignation has apparently been tempered by absence
of a jury and reluctance to impose penalties exceeding those permitted in
initial criminal prosecution." But additional punishment may accrue from
social opprobrium attached to conviction for contempt.
Both forms of contempt require proof that a specific injunctive provision
has been violated 79 and neither requires a jury trial., But the plaintiff in
the criminal proceeding must bear a heavier burden of proof 8t and surmount
distinction between the two forms of contempt. For an effort to evaluate the manifold
criteria, see Moscovitz, Contempt of InjunctionS, Cizil and Criminal, 43 CoL L. REV.
780, 781, 809-13 (1943). The main "dichotomy" seems to be that punishment is deemed
"remedial" in the civil and "punitive" in the criminal proceeding, Gompers v. Bucks
Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441, 451 (1911). The court has no discretion to re-
fuse appropriate civil relief, whereas it may withhold punishment for criminal contempt
See Parker v. United States, 153 F2d 66, 70 (C.C.A. 1st 1946).
77. JuD. CoDE §268 (1911), 28 U.S.C. § 385 (1940). This clause makes fines and
imprisonment exclusive alternatives. Timmons v. United States, 158 F.2d 370 (C.C.A.
4th 1946) (OPA). It may be replaced by statutory provision of maximum penalties for
specified offenses, but no such provision is applicable to violation of statutory injunction
obtained by any agency discussed here.
78. E.g., United States v. B. & V. Sportswear, 53 F. Supp. 785 (E.D.Y. 1943)
(jail sentence denied because unavailable in initial vage-hour prosecution). At least one
judge of that district has also remonstrated against lack of jury trial. Communication to
the YALE LAw JOURNAL from John J. Bab6, sipra note 24. But this reluctance is merely
a tendency, not a rule. In 1942 the judge who later decided the B. & IV. Sportswear case
had disregarded the same statutory provision and cracked the whip sharply: "I think an
example is to be set. When they agree to comply with the decree of the court, and then
violate it, it is time to stop fining them and send them to jail." United States v. Bush-
wick, 2 Wage Hour Cases 413, 414 (E.D.N.Y. 1942). And see United States ex rel.
Brown v. Lederer, 140 F2d 136, 139 (C.C.A. 7th 1944) (OPA), cert. dcnicd, 322 U.S.
734 (1944).
Although generalization is necessarily inaccurate, it appears that jail sentences are
seldom imposed and rarely exceed six months. Fines -ary widely, and apparently are set
with an eye on the contemnor's financial position. A small sawmill operator mas fined
only $150 for violating a child-labor injunction, In re Combs, 5 Wage Hour Cases 595
(M.D. Ga. 1945), whereas a retail food chain guilty of price violations was fined $43,600.
18 OPA Q. REP. 76 (1946). Other factors are the degree and number of violations, as
in Huffman v. United States, 148 F.2d 943 (C.C.A. 10th 1945) (five "deliberate and
flagrant" rent violations penalized $1,000 apiece). And see the criteria listed in United
States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 303 (1947).
79. See, e.g., Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 69 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.Fla. 1947)
(civil), and see note 81 infra (criminal). But in neither proceeding may the propriety of
the injunction be challenged. Taylor v. Bowles, 147 F2d 824 (C.C.A. 9th 1945) (civil);
Porter v. Merhar, 160 F.2d 397 (C.C.A. 6th 1947) (criminal).
80. A jury trial for criminal contempt is authorized, however, under a few statutes.
See note 122 infra.
81. In criminal contempt the plaintiff must overcome beyond reasonable doubt a
presumption of innocence. One court even refused on this ground to convict a company
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greater procedural hurdles.8 2 Civil contempt may also be more promptly
effective where it is interlocutory in nature and therefore precludes appeal
prior to completion of the original suit.s3 But despite the lesser likelihood of
success in the criminal action, agencies have usually felt that its attendant
penalties are necessary to punish disregard of a negative injunction.84 To
enforce mandatory decrees, however, civil proceedings are often selected
where complicated questions of law make the heavier burden of proof unde-
sirable as well as where speed is required.8 5
While contempt is the only direct sanction against violation of an injunc-
tion, independent remedies such as license suspension may also be invoked
by some agencies. 8 And in spite of its inherent difficulties, criminal prosecu-
tion is sometimes preferred, especially where the defendant has violated other
provisions of the statute as well as those covered by the injunction." But a
president who, upon being enjoined, set up a new corporation which committed identical
violations on the same premises. In re Storyk, 4 Wage Hour Cases 647. (D.P.R. 1944).
More typical, however, is United States ex rel. Bowles v. Seidman, 154 F.2d 228 (C.C.A.
7th 1945) (guiliy for offering to sell at violative prices although no actual sale made).
Willfulness must also be established in the criminal proceeding, but the requirement
is as lax as in initial prosecution. See note 48 supra. E.g., In re De Vera, 1 Wage
Hour Cases 423 (D.P.R. 1940); SEC v. Boise Petroleum Co., 1 S.E.C. Jud. Dec. 395
(D.Idaho 1937).
82. See Rule 42, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Comment, 57 YALVn L. 3.
83, 96 (1947). Criminal contempt must be handled by the United States Attorney or by
the court itself, but this hurdle can be obviated by judicial appointment of an agency
attorney as the "arm of the court". Cf. United States ex rel. Brown v. Lederer, 140 F.2d
136 (C.C.A. 7th 1944), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 734 (1944). And criminal as well as civil
contempt proceedings may be easier to initiate than prosecution, United States ex rel.
Bowles v. Seidman, 154 F.2d 228, 230 (C.C.A. 7th 1946). Contra: Bowles v, Bullock, 5
F.R.D. 147 (D.Del. 1945).
83. Taylor v. Bowles, 152 F.2d 311 (C.C.A. 9th 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 806
(1946). Crimixial contempt may'be appealed immediately upon conviction. Id at 312.
84. For a completely negative decree, civil contempt could usually lead at most to
payment of the agency's costs in bringing suit, which would seldom be an adequate
penalty. See OPA MANUAL § 9-6602.10B (1946).
85. Ibid. The Wage and Hour Division, for example, has instituted 49 civil and 133
criminal contempt proceedings (Oct. 1938-July 1946, figures supplied by Dept. of Labor,
Dec. 29, 1947; statistics on outcome of these proceedings are unavailable).
86. Since the OPA customarily issued a license warning notice whenever an injunc-
tive action was instituted, OPA MANUAL § 9-1801.02 (1946), the violation which could
justify contempt proceedings was also grounds for license suspension. See note 53 supra.
But in most instances the OPA seems to have relied on contempt proceedings because of
their greater stigma and publicity value.
An injunction per se constitutes grounds for the SEC to revoke a broker's license,
but this combination of sanctions has been relatively infrequent. See note 110 infra.
Violation of the injunction, however, might well be a persuasive indication that revoca-
tion is necessary even though contempt proceedings are also instituted.
87. Only those violations specifically barred by the injunction can be punished in
contempt proceedings. See cases cited note 79 supra. Prosecution may also be preferred
where the injunction's coverage of guilty parties is doubtful, as in United States v. Im-
perial Rug Co. (unreported; M.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 1947) (after partnership enjoined, one
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contempt proceeding is usually regarded as less precarious. The relative ease
with which it may be invoked,u the threat of high penalties, and the stigma-
tizing nature of the proceeding combine to make it an effective support for
the injunctive order.
Deterrent effect of the injunction.
Whether an individual will violate a regulatory statute seems to depend
largely on the subjective calculus of prospective gain in relation to respect
for the law and fear of punishment, variables which can at best be approxi-
mated. 89 Despite the mildness of the remedy, the limited nature of detection
facilities, and the occasional inadequacy of contempt penalties, an injunction
apparently increases respect and fear both in those enjoined and inotherpo-
tential violators.
The minute percentage of cases in which injunctions have culminated in
contempt proceedings indicates that judicial prohibition appreciably reduces
violation by those subject to the order, although investigative shortcom-
ings may create an exaggerated picture of compliance 5 While respect for
the court may often be a dissuading influence,0 ' the crucial factor is generally
whether the potential violator thinks he would be detected and punished. In
all probability he will overestimate the actual odds, for discovery of his pre-
vious dereliction should have enhanced his fear of detection, 2 and conviction
partner formed corporation which committed similar wage-hour violations), and where
the judge objects to absence of a jury in criminal contempt proceedings. Communication
from John J. Bab6, supra note 24. See note 78 supra.
88. See notes 78, 80, and-82 supra. Paradoxically, the OPA's record in contempt
proceedings of 82.8% (both civil and criminal, 1942-May 1947: 356 won, 73 lost, and 72
withdrawn) is lower than in criminal proceedings (93.4,; see note 49 supra). 22 OPA Q.
REP. 17 (1947). A probable explanation, however, is that the average violation leading
to contempt seems less flagrant than the carefully culled criminal cases (see OPA MA.;-
uL. 9-1702 (1946)). To preserve the integrity of the injunction, the OPA felt it necessary
to press contempt charges even though the case was relatively weak. Communication
from ThoaLms L Emerson, supra note 67.
89. Each situation inevitably varies with such factors as the potential violator's mo-
tive for violating (see note 105 infra), his susceptibility to social pressures, and the ef-
fectiveness with which those pressures are brought to bear.
90. Only 564 contempt proceedings were instituted by OPA, in comparison with
51,869 injunctions issued (1942-May 1947). 22 OPA Q. REP. 16-7 (1947). 4,978 Wage-
Hour injunctions have led to a mere 169 actions for contempt (Oct. 193S-June 1946;
statistics supplied by the Dept. of Labor, Dec. 29, 1947).
91. See Caldwell, supra note 5 at 274: "Respectable persons and corporations will
violate [regulatory] laws when they would not think of disobeying an injunction order-
ing compliance with them.' On this score a consent decree, which is relatively painless,
may have less deterent effect than an injunction granted after the defendant has contested
its issuance.
92. To arguments that the threat of contempt will not deter anyone not dissuaded
by fear of initial criminal prosection, Caldwell replies, "it would seem that an injunction
... is a more effective means of controlling that defendant's actions than is the prohibi-
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for contempt would not only tarnish his reputation but would also expose
him to penalties of unpredictable severity. 3 These inhibitions, however, may
be dissipated unless nurtured by adequate and well-publicized detection and
punishment of other violators.
In contrast with the immediate threat which contempt presents to those
already enjoined, the injunction itself is an exceptionally mild weapon with
which to threaten a hardened miscreant. For him, sanctions not permitting
a relatively free bite of forbidden fruit are necessary to outweigh tempta-
tion. 4 The Canadian government, considering an injunction too innocuous
to worry anyone contemplating breach of the underlying legislation, omitted
provisions therefor from its price control program.9 But United States ex-
perience indicates that the injunction is not always a futile weapon. The
disgrace of being branded a law-breaker is sufficient to make most reputable
concerns wary of risking its application, although the stigma apparently
diminishes in later stages of large-scale programs as injunctive decrees be-
tory language of a statute addressed to all inhabitants .... He knows that the eye of
the state is watching him . . ." Ibid.
93. See note 78 supra. The element of unpredicatability seems important. -Iere, as
in estimating the likelihood of detection, the enjoined presumably will be prone to exag-
gerate unless actually familiar with cases where violators escaped with minor penalties.
94. Even where criminal sanctions are imposed, sentences are frequently inadequate
to dter violations which might reap bonanza profits. Convinced that "only jail sentences
are effective as a deterrent in these more serious cases," the OPA complained that "the
fact that offenders . . . are often respectable men engaged in pursuing their self-interest
in ways which might not be forbidden in times of peace, has created an atmosphere which
tends to leniency." 13 OPA Q. RFP. 68 (1945). During the fiscal year 1946, 72.7% of
the 3,694 OPA criminal defendants were convicted; 39.4% were merely fined, while 21.0%
were placed on probation and received suspended sentences. Of the 12.3% imprisoned,
more than half (6.27o) received sentences of less than six months, and only 1.4% drew
sentences longer than a year and a day. ANN. REP. DiR. ADM. OFF. U.S. CouRTS 120
(1946). Most of the longer prison terms were meted out for offenses such as theft of
ration coupons. 13 OPA Q. RsP. 68 (1945). But even these criminals often "escaped
with nothing more than a fine-a most reasonable license fee for engaging in such a
lucrative racket." DuHi., op. cit. sufpra note 51.
Where the violator was a corporation and no responsible officers could be convicted,
the OPA generally preferred treble damages to criminal fines for flagrant violations be-
cause the penalties were potentially much higher. OPA MANUAL §9-1702.04B(2)
(1946). In many instances, however, "treble damage actions were ineffective . . . be-
cause of the impossibility of ascertaining the full amount of the violation." DUUL, op.
cit. supra note 51. License or rationing suspension was often more effective.
And in some situations a court might enjoin responsible officers, although the cor-
porate shield protected them from criminal prosecution, with subsequent violation leading
to conviction for contempt. See, e.g., cases cited notes 78 and 81 supra.
95. Enforcement was left almost entirely to criminal prosecution. See P.C. 8528
(1941), as amended, and Willis, Canada's Wartime Administrative Agcncies, 12 GEo.
WAsH. L. REv. 141, 161 (1944). Conversations of OPA officials with their British
counterparts indicated that the latter could see no reason for a court order prohibiting
practices already barred by statute. Communication from Thomas I. Emerson, supra
note 67.
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come more commones6 In addition, respect for the devious mysteries of "the
law" may give laymen a magnified conception of the injunction's severity,u"
particularly when contempt citations are numerous. Widespread use of
the sanction should also encourage the compliance of concerns similar to
those enjoined, by reducing the feeling of immunity and competitive pressure
to violate which arise from failure to penalize breaches of a statute. This
corrective value is maximized by attacking prevalent types of infraction,
while enjoining a widely respected concern is especially useful to publicize
an enforcement campaign and show that leaders in an industry are not ex-
empt.5 So used, the injunction may be substantially effective in deterring
essentially law-abiding citizens and in lessening negligent violationPv
ROLE IN THE ENFORCEMENT ARSENAL
Since the statutory injunction is not a panacea for all enforcement ills, an
administrator must determine in each situation whether the remedy's avail-
ability and effectiveness make it his most appropriate weapon I in view of
the relative culpability of the violation and the varying nature of the agency's
program.
96. "Contrary to some opinion, the injunction has a substantial deterrent effect upon
others. Especially among commercial establishments which boast a reputation for law-
observance and respectability, there is a healthy respect for this sanction." OPA
M uANAL. § 9-6602.09 (1946). However, as the number of injunctions increases, ... the
impact of the sanction seems to lessen .... [Ioreover,] injunctions in the early stages of
an enforcement program are likely to receive more publicity than in the later stages."
Communication from Thomas I. Emerson, supra note 67. Because it engenders little
publicity and carries less stigma, the consent decree should have less deterrent effect tha
a contested injunction.
97. As with the enjoined's fear of contempt penalties, however, public overestimation
of the injunction's severity may diminish if knowledge spreads that it can be violated
with impunity.
98. "By and large we should concentrate on the most flagrant or persistent cases as
the most direct means of getting a whole industry into line. ...We should attempt to
discover who are the leading violators in an industry and go after them hard....
Other things being equal, action against the larger firms will have the greater effecL ...
Of course this does not mean that we should take action against any firm merely be-
cause of its size." Memorandum to OPA Regional Administrators from Chester Bowles,
Jan. 31, 1945. In some instances, such an injunction may promote added support for en-
forcement by inspiring a trade association to denounce the violative practice. See, e.g., IS
OPA Q. REP. 75 (1946).
99. The OPA found, for example, that mere advance notice of intention to file in-
junction suits against all who failed to keep certain records was an effective method of
increasing compliance, although in some cases it was necessary to carry out the threat.
Communication from Thomas I. Emerson, supra note 67.
100. Only in one instance is an agency deprived of discretionary power to choose be-
tween its authorized sanctions: the NLRB is required to seek a temporary injunction
when it has "reason to believe" that jurisdictional strikes or secondary boycotts exist.
29 U.S.C.A. § 160(l) (Supp. 1947). This requirement does not apply in other types of
unfair labor practices. § 160(i).
A few specialized remedies, such as the SEC stop-order, Food and Drug condemna-
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Choosing the weapon.
The injunction is the only workable remedy for some types of violation.
No other weapon can halt state court proceedings "I' or forestall threatened
but unconsummated offenses, 10 2 and rarely is there any substitute for tem-
porary injunctive relief where a violative practice can be killed by enforced
interruption. 10 3 Necessary restitution, or appointment of an equity receiver,
moreover, may be obtained only through an injunction when the agency has
no statutory authority to seek them directly. 0 4
Where alternative sanctions are also possible, the propriety of an in-
junction depends largely on the relative culpability of the violation. 1 6 The
tion proceedings, and OPA rationing suspension (see OPA MANUAL § 9-1905.01 (1945)),
are almost sure to be selected in preference to an injunction where both are applicable.
But the choice between other sanctions usually depends on the particular fact situation.
101. Generally a federal district court has no jurisdiction to stay proceedings in a
state court, JuD. CODE § 265, 28 U.S.C. § 379 (1940), but the Supreme Court, by con-
struing 50 U.S.C. App. § 925 (a) (OPA) as an implied amendment thereto, permitted the
OPA to obtain a federal injunction restraining eviction of tenants under a state court
order, Porter v. Dicken, 328 U.S. 252 (1946), or restoring the evicted tenant to his
lodgings, Porter v. Lee, 328 U.S. 246 (1946). An injunction may also issue against
prosecution in a state court of suits to enjoin enforcement of a federal regulatory statute
under which state courts have no jurisdiction, Western Fruit Growers v. United States,
124 F.2d 381 (C.C.A. 9th 1941) (Market Administrator).
102. See, e.g., United States v. 184 Barrels Dried Whole Eggs, 53 F. Supp. 652, 653
(E.D. Wis. 1943). See note 52 supra.
103. E.g., FTC v. Thomsen-King, 109 F.2d 516 (C.C.A. 7th 1940): defendants were
found to be fleecing the public through misleading advertisements of a contest which would
be completed before a "cease and desist" order could have been issued. The temporary
injunction halted the contest beyond redemption. Only SEC stop-orders and Food and
Drug condemnation can operate as promptly.
The difficulty of reviving a strike after interruption by judicial mandate, cf. FRAvu-
FURTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNcTION 201 (1930), may make temporary Injunc-
tions under the Taft-Hartley Act almost as lethal, shedding grave doubt on the desira-
bility of that act's unusual provision for an injunction when there is merely "reason to
believe" that an unfair labor practice exists. See note 11 supra.
104. See note 57 .supra. Restitution is most important to the Wage and Hour Division,
which possesses no direct authority to collect damages of any kind. See note 123 infra.
It also proved valuable to the OPA where rent violations extended back beyond the
one-year period of limitation for treble damages. See OPA MANuAL § 9-6602.07 (1946).
More useful to the SEC has been adjunctive appointment of equity receivers to insure
that clients of insolvent firms are treated fairly. Although specifically authorized only by
the Investment Companies Act, 15 U.S.C. §80a-42(e), this relief may be granted as
ancillary to an injunction under other SEC statutes. Cf. Deckert v. Independence Shares
Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940) (suit under Securities Act).
105. DUHL, op. cit. supra note 51, grouped violators into five categories, each of which
required different sanction policies: (1) profiteers who desired to make a "killing"; (2)
sellers squeezed between established prices and increasing costs; (3) those ignorant of or
failing to understand the regulations; (4) those who neglected to provide adequate safe-
guards or mechanisms to insure compliance; (5) inadvertent violators who could not
prevent infractions despite all practicable precautions.
Regardless of the degree of culpability, the injunction is often preferred in "test
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weapon is best suited for application to negligent malfeasors whose future
compliance may be stimulated by a judicial mandate, and in such instances
it may replace administrative remedies, such as license revocation, which are
unduly severe for minor violations. 1*3 An injunction is frequently invoked,
however, in cases lying beyond this optimum range. While informal settle-
ment usually suffices if an unintentional violator is trusted to avoid further
offenses, the agency may nevertheless seek an injunction with the primary
aim of deterring others in the industry.'" In addition, the difficulty of ob-
taining criminal conviction even of intentional violators may lead the Ad-
ministrator, in all but flagrant cases, to settle for an injunction along with
treble damages, restitution, or license revocation.103
In many instances where other sanctions are necessary, the injunction may
still be valuable as an auxiliary weapon. The combination of future prohibi-
tion with damages for past violations counteracts weaknesses of both reme-
dies: the sting of punishment is added to the injunction, and the danger that
damages may become merely a "cost of doing business" is minimized by the
potentiality of imprisonment for contempt if the injunctive decree is vio-
lated.' A temporary injunction can provide useful interim relief where
other sanctions involve delay." 0 And although a permanent injunction and
cases" to obtain judicial interpretation. See pp. 1022-3 infra. It is understood that the SEC
prefers administrative sanctions in such cases because there is greater prospect of a
favorable initial outcome and the reviewing court may accord deference to the agency's
decision. That such benefits do not always accrue is evidenced by the OPA's record of
success in rationing suspension proceedings (89.85) in comparison with injunctive ac-
tions (98.87). And see the statistics on disciplinary proceedings in 13 SEC Ae.r. Rzm.
226, 228 (1947). But the greater severity of the administrative sanctions may account
for this disparity.
106. See Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc. SEC, Smi. Doc. No. 10, PAR 13, 77th Cong., 1st
Sess. 8 (1941). And the OPA seldom sought license suspension in such cases because,
although "remedial" from the agency's viewpoint, "it has a serious punitive effect upon
the licensee." OPA MAxuAL § 9-1803.02 (1946).
107. See, for example, the agency's argument in Fleming v. Phipps, 35 F. Supp. 627
(D. Aid. 1940) (supra note 64). But the court almost always denies an injunction, as in the
Phipps case, unless it finds that there is some doubt as to the defendant's future compliance.
108. In selecting cases for criminal action, the OPA applied an exhaustive list of
practical standards, including intangibles such as "psychological atmosphere". OPA MA:-
uAL § 9-1702 (1946). Stringent selectivity is particularly important in mass enforcement
(see note 112 infra), but no agency program is enhanced by a string of acquittals.
109. See Ross, Inflation Control: The Enforccmcnt Job, 5 LAw. Gunn Itrv. 356, 360
(1945). The OPA customarily utilized this combination. OPA MAz.uzAL §9-6.11
(1946).
110. See, e.g., note 60 supra. In one situation, moreover, the injunction facilitates
application of.another remedy: under 15 U.S.C. §780(b), issuance of an injunction is
grounds for SEC revocation of the defendant broker-dealer's license. The combination
is useful where an activity warranting revocation must be halted promptly, but since
July 1939, only 40 revocation proceedings have been instituted primarily on this ground.
13 SEC Amx. REP. 226 (1947).
Under the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § SOb-3(d), the injunction performs a
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criminal penalties are usually regarded as alternatives, the SEC occasionally
seeks the former as a prelude to prosecution."'
Utility as a mass enforcement weapon.
The qualities which make the statutory injunction a valuable enforcement
weapon are accentuated in a mass enforcement program such as price control
because of the relatively light burden which the remedy places on court and
agency. In contrast with severe sanctions such as criminal prosecution,
which must be carefully restricted to avoid swamping jury calendars, 112 the
injunction may be handled expeditiously and encourages consent decrees.113
It also takes a lighter toll of investigative as well as litigative facilities, an
important factor since enforcement staffs are generally undermanned. 1" 4
Another major advantage of the injunction is its value as a vehicle for
educational litigation. During early stages of enforcement an agency needs
prompt judicial interpretation of the statute to define its own powers and
clarify the requirements of compliance for those subject fo the program.116
more essential role as one of the three alternative prerequisites (along with criminal con-
viction or willful misstatement) to revocation.
111. E.g., SEC v. Woodman, S.E.C. Litig. Release No. 216 (unreported; D. Mass. 1944)
(permanent injunction), followed by United States v. Woodman, S.E.C. Litig. Release No.
306 (unreported; D. Mass. 1945) (criminal conviction for same violation). Interviews with
officials of other agencies reveal that such a combination, although valuable as a continu-
ing mandate, is normally frowned on because of added consumption of limited litigation
facilities and danger that the government's case for criminal prosecution may be pre-
maturely revealed in the injunctive hearing.
112. Because of this danger the OPA decreed that "no prosecution should be recom-
mended unless the case has clear significance for enforcement beyond the administering
of deserved punishment." OPA MANUAL § 9-1702.02 (1946).
113. In 1944 only 3.0% of the OPA's civil cases reached trial; in 1945 the figure was
2.2o, while consent decrees accounted for 79.6% of the total. See note 42 supra. ANN.
REP. DiR. ADM. OFF. U.S. CouRTs 47, 51 (1945).
114. One reason why the OPA relied so heavily on the injunction was that "investiga-
tions laying a basis for criminal or treble damage proceedings required far more tinie and
resources." Communication from Thomas I. Emerson, supra note 67.
115. For the period immediately after a statute goes into effect, there is comparatively
little litigation. An educational program is far more important, and fledgling staffs are
inadequate to pursue both activities extensively. See 1 W. & H. ANN. REP. 61 (1939)
and 2 OPA Q. REP. 54-5 (.1942). A large proportion of the limited enforcement facilities
are directed at blatantly willful violators, who must be punished to prevent disregard of
the statute; injunctive actions are instituted primarily to obtain judicial interpretation
or in key cases having wide deterrent effect. As a result, the excess of injunctive over
criminal actions is small. In the second quarter of 1942 the OPA initiated 45 of the
former as compared to 33 of the latter. Ibid. But attempts to "cut corners" soon become
more common than flagrant violations, and injunctions are well suited to check "wide-
spread violations arising out of ignorance, inertia, or expectancy of non-enforcement"; in
addition, techniques for widespread application of the sanction (see note 95 .supra) are
developed. Communication from Thomas I. Emerson, supra note 67. The extent to which
injunctions outstrip criminal prosecution is indicated by ANN. REP. W. & H. Div. 95
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In this quest the agency is less hampered by the injunction's relatively light
burden of proof. The possibility that judicial interpretation may be colored
by feeling against "bureaucracy" is minimized by the remedy's mildness,
which is especially appropriate where the statute is unfamiliar and where
public as well as judicial confidence in the agency's fairness must be fos-
tered."' At the the same time the injunction carries a stigma severe enough
to counsel compliance, and the frequency with which it may be obtained in
key cases gives it a total deterrent value equal to that of more severe sanc-
tions which are less frequently available. 1 7
As a program matures beyond its educational phase, the injunction de-
clines in importance. Sanctions instilling greater fear of punishment should
be relatively easier to obtain than previously," 8 for increased familiarity
with the statute limits the defense that violations were unintentional, and
improving techniques of investigation can better support the heavier burden
of proof. These sanctions also become more necessary to deter violations
when extensive use of the injunction begins to reduce its accompanying
stigma."' In combination with treble damages or restitution, however, the
(1940), 52 (1941):
Actions Instituted: Nov. '38-Dec. '39 Nov. '38-June '40 July '40-June '41
Injunctive: 83 (57%) 403 (78%) 16S9 (97%)
Criminal: 63 (437o) 113 (22%) 60 ( 3%)
116. Even in 1945 this remained a problem for OPA. Reiterating that "we do not
wish to create the impression that we are enforcing for the sake of enforcement," the
Administrator added: "With a new regulation it may be advisable to wait until [educa-
tional] compliance measures have had a chance to operate." Memorandum to Regional
Administrators from Chester Bowles, Jan. 31, 1945.
117. In key cases criminal prosecution is seldom successful, for "such violators are
often not 'criminals' in the usual sense. Rather, the selection of key cases will often in-
volve action against what have hitherto been some of the most respectable members of
an industry." The frequency with which injunctions may be obtained is also important,
for "in some situations quantity may be important in itself.. in making an impression on
the industry and the public." Ibid.
118. For example, OPA's record of success in actions for severe sanctions improved
markedly in 1945 over that of 1944 (statistics obtained from National Archives):
Percent won, of cases decided in: 1944 1945
Injunction: 98.0% of 10,693 97.7% of 22,900
Adm'r's Own Treble Damage Suits: 90.9% of 674 97.4% of Z6-20
Adm'r's Consumer Treble Damage: 91.4% of 162 97.3c of 5,438
License Suspension: 94.5% of 55 94.8% of 134
Criminal: 92.1% of 4,513 94.1% of 3,663
119. The histories of both the Wage and Hour Division and OPA indicate the ex-
tent to which more severe sanctions are invoked. See ANN. REP. NV. & H. Div. 12
(1944),26 (1946) and9 (1947):
Fiscal
Year: 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947
Injunctions
instituted: 1203 (927o) 493 (91%o) 347 (89%) 371 (90%) 281 (69%) 260 (63%)
Criminal
cases
instituted: 111 ( 8%) 51 ( 9%) 41 (11%) 39 (10%) 126 (317) 155 (37%)
The abrupt shift in 1946 appears to indicate a drastic change in the agency's sanction
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injunction retains a significant role because of its ready availability and the
value of a continuing mandate of compliance. 120
CONCLUSION
The ease and speed with which a statutory injunction may be obtained,
in contrast with the relative difficulty of invoking other sanctions, have been
vital factors in the success of agency enforcement programs. Similarly, its
preventive nature and inherent mildness have made it a valuable alternative
to harsher weapons. While the battle-cry of "government by injunction"
still carries unpleasant implications, the public has acquiesced in the use of
the remedy to enforce regulatory statutes. 21
policy. Perhaps a percentage of violations were willful because of increased familiarity
with the statute, or the end of the war may have permitted reinspection of establishments
previously warned and again found in violation-no authoritative explanation is obtainable.
But these reasons would all spring from the program's increased maturity, and the change
seems 'too sharp to be entirely fortuitous.
While decreasing budget allotments reduced Wage and Hour litigation, the number
of OPA cases (until decontrol began in 1946) soared as investigative techniques de-
veloped. See the following OPA Q. REPs.: 8 at 71, 12 at 75, 17 at 104, 18 at 82, 19 at
95, and 20 at 83 (percentages are of total civil sanctions instituted) :
1943 1944 1945 1946
Injunctions: 4,516 (85.6%) 16,649 (76.1%) 33,756 (67.6%) 21,650 (58.3%)
Total Treb. Drng. Suits: 751 (14.3%) 5,027 (23%) 15,867 (31.8%) 15,062 (40.3%)
License Suspension:' 6 (0.1%) 190 (0.9%) 307 (0.6%) 525 (1.4%)
Total Civil Sanctions
(predominantly price) : 5,273 21,866 49,930 37,337
Total Criminal Suits
(Price & Rationing): 3,664 4,814 4,038 1,688
Rationing Suspensions: 10,132 12,171 18,012 10,675
Correlation of criminal with injunctive statistics is prevented by two factors: (1) the
number of criminal actions necessarily remained limited (see note 112 supra); (2) a
preponderant number of these actions involved rationing violations, for which the al-
ternative sanction was usually rationing suspension rather than injunction (see notes 94
and 100 supra). But the trend toward heavier civil sanctions for price violations was
pronounced.
120. See note 109 supra. The injunction is still used alone "to prevent more subtle
types of violation taking the form of evasions, ... to test interpretations, and for slim-
lar purposes." Communication from Thomas I. Emerson, supra note 67.
Perhaps this change in the type of violation against which injunctions are invoked,
along with more stringent agency terms for settlement (see OPA MAxUAL § 9-6602.08
(1946)), operates to increase the percentage of cases contested in later stage of enforce-
ment. The Wage and Hour Division's experience shows a particularly steady trend, ANN.
REPs. W. & H. Drv. 11 (1942), 12(1944), and 26(1946):
Fiscal year: 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946
Instituted: 1,203 493 347 371 281
Contested: 31 (2.6%) 74 (15.0%) 77 (22.2%) 106 (28.6%) 136 (48.4%)
121. Although objections are still heard from those who might be immune to prosecu-
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Admittedly, the injunctive process is not innocuous or incapable of abuse.
Unnecessary injunctions should be avoided, since the stigma accompanying
judicial prohibition injures even a defendant who thereafter complies with
the statute. The possibility of contempt proceedings counsels against de-
crees broader than are necessary to prevent evasion. Less valid as a cause for
concern has been the modification of equity shibboleths-a development
which was necessary to convert the injunction into an effective enforcement
weapon. Judicial discretion, however, can cope with all three of these dan-
gers: it provides a bulwark against abuse, and duplicates the justifiable pro-
tective function of the traditional requirements without preserving their ob-
structive rigidity. An added precaution, legislative provision for a jury trial
in contempt proceedings, 22 would appear highly desirable in view of the fre-
quency with which a statutory injunction is used as an alternative to criminal
prosecution. But in other respects no drastic amendment appears necessary.
Courts have usually managed to strike a reasonably sound balance between
those perpetual antagonists, private right and public interest.
The shortcomings of the injunction are seldom those of overseverity, for
no formal sanction is less onerous. They lie rather in its inadequacy to deter
hardened violators, and in the difficulty of insuring compliance with its
terms. The former deficiency may be buttressed by combination with heavier
sanctions such as treble damages. The latter must be countered by reserving
sufficient facilities for reinvestigation, even at the expense of important ini-
tial coverage. Only where Congress provides adequate alternative sanctions
and sufficient investigative facilities can the potential of the injunction be
fully realized. 12
3
tion but are fair game for an injunction, there is nothing approaching the barrage of
criticism formerly directed at injunctions against labor unions or Prohibition .iolators. See,
for example, Dunbar, Government by Injmction, 13 LAW Q. Rr v. 347, 355 et scq. (1897)
(unions); Black, The Expansion of Criminal Equity Under Prohibition, 5 Wis. L. Rv.
412 (1930) ; Comment, 20 CoL. L. Rsv. 605(1920) ("Red Light" districts). These authors
justifiably objected to the consequent avoidance of jury trial, and feared that legislatures
might unduly expand the venerable concept of "public nuisance." See note 4 supra.
Current public acquiescence seems to stem from a number of factors: (1) greater
public approval of these regulatory statutes; (2) recognition that they must be enforced
against minor violators; (3) limitation by courts on the scope of decrees; (4) the rela-
tive infrequency of contempt proceedings and the rarity of excessive penalties therein.
122. A few statutes already provide jury trial for criminal contempt. E.g., Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. § 332b; Clayton Act, 23 U.S.C. § 387 (inap-
plicable to suits brought by agencies on behalf of U.S.). Such provisions should remove
the major objection to enforcement by injunction. See note 121 supra. It may be, as was
contended in it re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 595 (1895), that "to submit the question of dis-
obedience to another tribunal, be it jury or another court, would operate to deprive the
proceeding of half its efficiency." But it seems unvse to disregard the possibility that
"efficiency" may occasionally flourish at the e-xpense of justice. The statutory injunction
is too valuable a weapon to risk its discredit as a mere device for escaping jury trial, and
"a certain amount of effectiveness may well be sacrificed in order that public confidence
and trust in our courts may not be lost." Caldwell, supra note 5 at 231. See Comment,
57 YALE L. J. 83, 97 (1947).
123. Currently the chief victim of Congressional neglect seems to be the Wage and
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Despite its shortcomings, the statutory injunction is a highly valuable
weapon which auring the past fifteen years has proved its right to a major
role in the enforcement arsenal of federal administrative agencies.
Hour Division. Its investigative staff is extremely small in relation to the size of its
program. See note 67 supra. It cannot bring a civil action to collect back wages for
employees except through restitution, which may be barred in many instances; see note
57 supra. See also ANN. REP. W. & H. Div. 65 (1946): "In the overwhelming majority
of cases ... employees do not bring suit .... At present employers have little induce-
nent to pay wages found due on inspection .... The knowledge by employers that the
Administrator could bring suit for recovery would lead to voluntary restitution in the
overwhelming majority of instances." Certainly the OPA's experience with treble
damage suits would seem to justify this claim.
